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Transferable Public Rights: Reconciling Public
Rights and Private Property*
The "key-log" which must be moved to release the evolutionary process for an
ethic is simply this: quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic
problem. Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and esthetically
right, as well as what is economically expedient. A thing is right when it tends
to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is
wrong when it tends otherwise.
Aldo Leopold**
I. INTRODUCTION
The American system of property encompasses both public and pri-
vate ownership of land and other natural resources.' While opinions dif-
fer as to which type of ownership is best for society,2 private land
ownership remains protected by the takings clause of the fifth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, which forbids the taking of pri-
vate property for public use without just compensation.3
The Supreme Court's interpretations of the takings clause are con-
troversial because these decisions necessarily define the nature and extent
* This research was sponsored in part by the New York Sea Grant Institute under a grant from
the Office of Sea Grant, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S.
Department of Commerce. The United States Government and the New York Sea Grant Institute
are authorized to produce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes notwithstanding any
copyright notation that may appear herein.
** A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 224-25
(1968).
1. For an historical discussion of how public and private land ownership evolved in America see
Freyfogle, Land Use and the Study of Early American History (Book Review), 94 YALE L.J. 717
(1985).
2. See, e.g., A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE viii
(1968) (Suggesting that "[w]e abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us.");
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (Resources held in common will be
wasted or destroyed by individuals seeking to maximize individual utility, since the negative utility
of individual conduct will be absorbed by all members of the commons); Rose, The Comedy of the
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 723 (1986)
(Raising the possibility that "properties devoted to such noncommercial uses as recreation or speech
could achieve their highest value when they are accessible to the public at large.").
3. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONsT. amend. V. The takings clause has been incorporated against the states through the four-
teenth amendment. See Chicago, B.& Q. Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1897).
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of property rights for the entire nation. The definition of property rights
chosen by the Court reflects its attitudes towards the relationship be-
tween individuals, society, and the environment. Since these attitudes un-
dergo change, the nature of property rights and takings jurisprudence
also changes over time.4
Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that a significant transfor-
mation in takings doctrine is in progress. If the constitutional dimensions
of land use are radically altered, the consequences will affect private
property owners, local governments, coastal zone management pro-
grams, and the public at large. Therefore, this article will examine the
history of takings doctrine, and how the Supreme Court's 1987 Takings
Trilogy is likely to affect land use planning in the years to come. It will be
suggested that the Court should utilize a new theory, which I call Trans-
ferable Public Rights, in order to harmonize public and private interests
in natural resources.
II. EARLY SUPREME COURT TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
While private ownership of real property is constitutionally pro-
tected, it is also well established that property owners are not absolutely
free to do what they wish with their property. Under the tenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, the states retain the police
power, which authorizes them, and their political subdivisions, to restrict
land use in order to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citi-
zens.' The police power functions as a constitutional counterweight to
4. "In a dynamic economy like the American [one,] the bundle of legal claims called 'property'
never remains stable: a change in technical processes, a shift in consumption habits, a new invention
in technology or managerial practice, a depression or a war, may give new value to claims hitherto
ignored or diminish others- hitherto cherished." 1 M. LERNER, AMERICA AS A CIVILIZATION 297
(1957). However, changes are not necessarily linear. As a consequence, some have referred to the
Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence as "muddled." See, e.g., Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why
the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984).
5. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. See, e.g.,
Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 U.S. 521, 528-529 (1877); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887);
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
The police power had to be used for reasons of health, safety or the general welfare, and not in an
arbitrary or discriminatory manner. But, in Mugler, Justice Harlan stated that:
[I]t does not at all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of these
ends, is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion of the police powers of the State. There
are, of necessity, limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go .... The courts are
not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere pretences. They are at
liberty- indeed, are under a solemn duty-to look at the substance of things, whenever
they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its
authority.
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the takings clause, since valid exercises of the police power are not tak-
ings, even if they reduce a property's value.
Initially, the Court appeared uninterested in curbing the uses of the
police power. fn Munn v. Illinois,6 an early police power case which up-
held the price regulation of grain elevators,7 the Court implored the
"people" to "resort to the polls, not the courts" for protection from legis-
lative abuses of the police power.8 Judicial review of the police power
gradually became more prevalent in later cases,9 although the Court fre-
quently deferred to legislative objectives.
In Mugler v. Kansas, a Kansas Prohibition statute banned the "man-
ufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, except for medical, scientific,
and mechanical purposes. . . 2 o Mugler owned a brewery before and
after the enactment of the Prohibition statute, and appealed from a mis-
demeanor conviction for its violation on grounds that the statute violated
the fourteenth amendment."I In an opinion by Justice Harlan, the Court
declared that the prohibition statute was a constitutional exercise of the
police power and not a taking for the public benefit.
Justice Harlan reasoned that regulations promulgated under the po-
lice power could not be considered a taking because they merely prohib-
ited uses which were harmful to the public interest. 2 He indicated that
there was a clear distinction between taking for public use and an exer-
cise of the police power.'" According to Harlan, uses of property, con-
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661.
6. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
7. On the grounds that the owners of an elevator had "clothed the public with an interest in
their concerns." Munn, 94 U.S. at 133.
8. 94 U.S. at 134.
9. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 39-40 (1964).
10. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 655 (1887).
11. 123 U.S. at 654.
12. See Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning (Making Room for Robert
Moses, William Zeckendorf, and a City Planner in the Same Community), 58 COLuM. L. REv. 650,
666 (1958). A significant expansion upon Harlan's ideas on the police power, (compensation is un-
necessary when the public prevents a property owner "from imposing a cost upon others," although
it is required for regulations which "obtain" public benefits)Jd.
13. Harlan stated, in what is now a famous passage, that:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid
legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in
any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit.
Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for
lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the
State that its use by any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public
interests.
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69.
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trary to legislative determinations of what was in the public interest, were
abatable common nuisances, whereas takings deprived "innocent" own-
ers of "unoffending property."' 4 This circular reasoning had the effect of
making legislatures the final arbiters of the takings clause. Furthermore,
Harlan's public nuisance analysis failed to precisely define the notions of
public harm and public benefit,'" nor was it capable of resolving more
complex situations where the prevention of a public harm also resulted in
a public benefit.
An important development in the Court's takings jurisprudence oc-
curred in Lawton v. Steele,I6 where the destruction of fishing nets, which
were used to violate state conservation laws, was upheld as a valid exer-
cise of the police power. In that case, the Court reaffirmed that, contrary
to Munn, legislative exercises of the police power would be subject to
judicial review.' 7 According to the majority opinion written by Justice
Brown, in order for the use of the police power to be valid, "it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second,
that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals."' 8
Later decisions, such as Reinman v. Little Rock,' 9 also placed few
restrictions upon the police power but continued to follow Harlan's ap-
proach.2 ° In Reinman, the Court upheld an ordinance which designated
14. 123 U.S. 669. Under Harlan's analysis, a regulation was valid under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, unless it was "apparent that its real object [was] not to protect the community, or to promote
the general well-being .. ." Id.
15. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1196-1198 (1967).
16. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
17. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily
interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon
lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of
its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. at 137.
18. 152 U.S. at 137. Modem takings cases utilize analyses similar to the one in Lavton. Cf Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
19. 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
20. Cf Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) Justice Harlan displayed less deference to legisla-
tive policy. He declared:
The idea that any legislature, state or Federal, can conclusively determine for the people
and for the courts that what it enacts in the form of law, or what it authorizes its agents
to do, is consistent with the fundamental law, is in opposition to the theory of our insti-
tutions. The duty rests upon all courts, Federal and state,... to see to it that no right
secured by the supreme law of the land is impaired or destroyed by legislation.
169 U.S. at 527-28.
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livery stables in certain areas as a nuisance. The Court declared that as
long as the regulation was not arbitrary or discriminatory, it did not vio-
late the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment.21
The Court continued to defer to the police power in Hadacheck v.
Sebastian,"2 and acknowledged that the only limitation upon the police
power under Mugler and Reinman was that it could not be used in an
arbitrary or discriminatory fashion. Hadacheck was convicted for violat-
ing a Los Angeles city ordinance prohibiting the manufacture of brick
within the city limits. Interestingly, Hadacheck's brick factory had ex-
isted outside the city limits without criticism until the city decided to
expand its boundaries due to the pressures of increased development.
Even though the newer development was inconsistent with existing land
use, it was Hadacheck who was forced to bear the costs of curtailing his
business activities. The Court boldly announced that "[t]here must be
progress, and if in its march private interests are in the way they must
yield to the good of the community. '2 3
Justice Holmes had a different perspective in Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon24 and attempted to analyze the police power in terms of its effect
on the value of property rights.25 In Mahon, the Court concluded that a
Pennsylvania statute designed to prevent mine subsidence was an uncon-
stitutional use of the police power.2 6 In the majority opinion, Holmes
21. While such regulations are subject to judicial scrutiny upon fundamental grounds, yet
a considerable latitude of discretion must be accorded to the law-making power; and so
long as the regulation in question is not shown to be clearly unreasonable and arbitrary,
and operates uniformly upon all persons similarly situated in the particular district, the
district itself not appearing to have been arbitrarily selected, it cannot be judicially de-
clared that there is a deprivation of property without due process of law, or a denial of
the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
237 U.S. at 177 (citations omitted).
22. 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915).
23. 239 U.S. at 410. But see Spur Indust., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d
700 (1972). (Subdivision developer required to indemnify business which had, because of its proxim-
ity to newly built homes, become a nuisance). Cf A.A. Profiles, Inc. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 850
F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1988) (rezoning ordinance prohibiting wood-chipping operation in residential
area held an unconstitutional taking), cert denied, 109 S.Ct. 1743 (1989).
24. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
25. For discussions of the differences between Harlan and Holmes on the taking issue, see
Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: Justice Brennan
Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 15, 33-44 (1983)[hereinafter
Bauman]; F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 124-138 (1973).
26. The statute, known as the "Kohler Act", required mining companies to leave coal pillars of
sufficient size in exhausted mines so as to prevent occupied surface land from collapsing. Mahon, 260
U.S. at 412-13.
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conceded that all property is held under implied limitations and is sub-
ject to the exercise of the police power. However, he reasoned that if the
implied limitations on property ownership were not circumscribed, cer-
tain protections of the Constitution, such as the contract and due process
clauses, would become meaningless. 27 Thus, Holmes concluded that
under an exercise of the police power, when "the extent of the diminu-
tion... reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must
be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act." 28
That statement of Justice Holmes, however, never indicated at what
point an alleged police power regulation crossed the threshold and be-
came a taking.29
Only four years later, the Supreme Court decided to uphold a zon-
ing ordinance which had severely diminished a property's value in Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co..30 In Euclid, the owner of a parcel
brought suit against a village because part of his tract had been zoned
from industrial to residential and other less intensive uses. Allegedly, this
re-zoning significantly reduced the property's value. However, the Court
found that increases in population density justified additional restrictions
on land use.
In its decision, the Court likened zoning regulations to exercises of
the police power to control nuisances. The extent of the zoning power
depended upon the "circumstances and conditions" of the locality, in-
cluding the cumulative impact that intensified development would have
on an area. In particular, the Court feared that an apartment house
would act as a "parasite" upon the aesthetically pleasing environment
and open spaces of detached home neighborhoods. 3 Since intensified de-
velopment threatened to destroy exclusive residential neighborhoods, the
Court concluded that the reasons behind the ordinance were "sufficiently
cogent to preclude" finding the ordinance an arbitrary or unreasonable
27. 260 U.S. at 413.
28. Id..
29. See McGinley, Regulatory "Takings" The Remarkable Resurrection of Economic Substan.
tiveDue ProcessAnalysis in ConstitutionalLaw, 17 ENVTL.L.REP.(News and Analysis) 10369, 10375
n.58 (Sept. 1987).
Holmes suggests here [in Mahon] and in other cases that 'diminution of value' is an
indicator of when a regulation goes 'too far.' However, this diminution of value test is
certainly not applicable to situations where the police power is exercised to protect the
public from immoral, unsafe, or similar noxious or nuisance activities.
To the extent that professor McGinley is correct about this point, Holmes' analysis suffers from
the same weakness as Harlan's nuisance approach.
30. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
31. 272 U.S. at 394.
[Vol. 37904
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exercise of the police power.32 Euclid became a landmark constitutional
decision. It not only justified zoning regulations as police power legisla-
tion on the usual health and safety grounds, but also on aesthetic
grounds such as preserving open spaces.
III. MODERN SUPREME COURT TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
A. Penn Central and TDRs
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,33 the takings
issue arose from an application of New York City's landmark preserva-
tion law, which prevented the owners of Grand Central Station from
building a 55-story office building on top of the station.
The landmark preservation law was upheld because the Court con-
cluded that it was "reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substan-
tial public purpose" and did not have "an unduly harsh impact upon the
owner's use of the property".34 It was also significant to the Court that
Penn Central had made a reasonable return on the terminal for many
years, and that investment-backed expectations had not been disturbed
by the law.
The decision focused upon the economic impact of the regulation
because the Court equated the landmark law with other valid land use
regulations concerning aesthetics, and because Penn Central did not con-
test that the landmark law had a permissible governmental goal.35 The
Court's assessment of the hardship imposed by the regulation empha-
sized that the nature of the government action, and its effect on the prop-
erty rights of the parcel in the aggregate, did not constitute a taking.
36
New York City's landmark preservation law added an interesting
consideration to the Court's analysis by providing affected property own-
ers with transferable development rights (TDRs). The TDRs allowed a
property owner to exceed zoning restrictions on other property in the
32. 272 U.S. at 395. While the Court acknowledged the constitutionality of zoning ordinances
as a general practice, in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the application of a
particular zoning ordinance to a property owner's parcel was found to violate the fourteenth amend-
ment, where the zoning restrictions did not "bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare." (citation omitted) 277 U.S. at 188.
33. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
34. 438 U.S. at 127 (citations omitted).
35. 438 U.S. at 129.
36. 438 U.S. at 130-131; see also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (Destruction of
one "strand" in a "bundle" of property rights does not necessarily amount to a taking because "the
aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.").
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vicinity, up to the value of the landmark property's development rights.37
According to the Court, TDRs alleviated the concern expressed in
Mahon that police power regulations might sometimes have unduly
harsh consequences for property owners. The Court reasoned that while
TDRs might not have been "just compensation if a 'taking' had oc-
curred," they served to "mitigate" any impact that the law might have
had on Penn Central.38
B. Physical Invasions: Loretto, Kaiser Aetna, and Pruneyard
As in other areas of constitutional law, the Court's classification of a
government activity in takings jurisprudence can be extremely impor-
tant. The right to exclude others is considered a fundamental attribute of
property which cannot be terminated without just compensation.3 9
Therefore, when the Court characterizes a government activity as a phys-
ical invasion, it is prepared to declare the action unconstitutional.4"
In Kaiser Aetna v. U.S.,4 a private marina was constructed on the
island of Oahu, Hawaii and connected to a bay with the permission of the
Army Corps of Engineers. After the multi-million dollar marina was
connected to the bay, a dispute arose as to whether the public had to be
given access to the marina under a navigational servitude. The United
States alleged that the marina was subject to the servitude, because it was
connected to, and as a consequence had become part of, the navigable
waters of the United States. The Court held that the government's action
had produced certain "expectancies," i.e., investment-backed expecta-
tions, and that under such circumstances, a navigational servitude would
amount to a physical invasion.
In order to accommodate freedom of speech considerations, the
physical invasion reasoning of Kaiser Aetna was relaxed in Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins.42 In Pruneyard, high school students, who
were distributing pamphlets and asking people to sign petitions, were
told by a security guard that a shopping center policy prohibited such
activity unless it was related to the center's commerce. The California
Supreme Court ruled that under the California Constitution the Center
37. This was subject to a twenty percent limit per property. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 114.
38. 438 U.S. at 137.
39. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
40. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872) (invasions authorized by
government which impair or destroy a property's usefulness are takings) [hereinafter Pumpelly].
41. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
42. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
[Vol. 37
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had to allow the students to express themselves.43 The Supreme Court of
the United States affirmed the California Supreme Court on the ground
that the Shopping Center owners "failed to demonstrate that the 'right to
exclude others' is so essential to the use or economic value of their prop-
erty that the state-authorized limitation of it amounted to a 'taking.' "I
The Court was not as lenient in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CA TV Corp.45 In Loretto, a New York statute required landlords to al-
low cable television facilities to be installed upon their premises. The
price that landlords could charge the cable companies for installation
was regulated by a state commission, and it determined that a single one
dollar charge was reasonable for the cable equipment attached to
Loretto's building. The Court ruled that the government had authorized
a permanent physical occupation of Loretto's property, and that "a per-
manent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking with-
out regard to the public interests that it may serve."'46 In effect, the
Loretto decision reduced the threshold at which physical invasions would
be tolerated by the Court, since there was no showing that the installa-
tion of cable wires would impair the use or economic value of Loretto's
building. 7
C. Keystone: Investment Expectations, the Contract Clause, and Due
Process Revisited
In the spring of 1987, the Court re-examined several old takings
jurisprudence issues-investment-backed expectations, the contract
clause and the control of mine subsidence-in Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association v. DeBenedictis.48 In Keystone, the Court upheld a subsidence
statute similar to the one struck down in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon. It
43. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 78. In Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1976), the Supreme
Court emphasized that under Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) there is no Federal consti-
tutional right of access to shopping centers under the first amendment. Hudgens effectively overruled
Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), which had guar-
anteed the right of access to peacefully picket in private shopping centers under the first amendment.
44. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 84.
45. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
46. 458 U.S. at 426.
47. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 828(l)(a)(iii) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) provided as follows:
1. No landlord shall
a. interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon his property or prem-
ises, except that a landlord may require: ...
iii. that the cable television company agree to indemnify the landlord for any damage
caused by the installation, operation or removal of such facilities, quoted in Loretto, 458
U.S. at 423 n.3.
48. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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did this by distinguishing the Kohler Act, struck down in Mahon as an
act which served only private interests, not public health or safety. 49
Holmes' concern about protecting the validity of the contract and due
process clauses was to a large extent ignored. The Court declared "[tihat
private individuals erred in taking a risk cannot estop the Common-
wealth from exercising its police power to abate activity akin to a public
nuisance." 50
Keystone did not really expand the scope of the police power beyond
modern sensibilities; mine subsidence is a serious public health and safety
threat which most people consider an abatable public nuisance. The sig-
nificance of Keystone was its divergence from the modern trend of em-
phasizing investment-backed expectations. This aberation was probably
due to the Court's perception that Keystone involved unreasonable in-
vestment expectations and did not reflect the nation's relatively new
political consensus on environmental safety and quality.
D. First Lutheran Churctu Temporary Takings
The Court's decision in First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles
County5" indicated that Keystone did not usher in a new era where the
police power would reign supreme, as it had during the tenure of the first
Justice Harlan. In First Lutheran Church, Los Angeles County estab-
lished a flood protection area in the Mill Creek Canyon after a flood in
the canyon destroyed a campground owned by a church. The county's
interim ordinance prohibited the reconstruction of destroyed buildings or
the construction of new ones in the designated flood protection zone.52
As a consequence, the church filed an inverse condemnation suit -3 seek-
ing damages in the Superior Court of California, claiming that the ordi-
nance deprived the church of all use of the campground. 4
The Superior Court and the California Court of Appeal both refused
to accept the church's inverse condemnation claim. They based their de-
cisions upon the rule established by the California Supreme Court in
49. 480 U.S. at 486.
50. 480 U.S. at 488.
51. 482 U.S. 304 (1987) [hereinafter First Lutheran Church].
52. First Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 307.
53. Inverse condemnation has been referred to as "the remedy which a property owner is per-
mitted to prosecute to obtain the just compensation which the Constitution assures him when his
property, without prior payment therefor, has been taken or damaged for public use," Van Alstyne,
Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REv.
727, 730 (1967). See also, United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
54. First Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 308.
[Vol. 37
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Agins v. Tiburon, which held that, in the State of California, landowners
may not maintain suits for inverse condemnation on the grounds that a
regulatory taking has occurred. 5 Rather, in such circumstances, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court established that the proper action is for declara-
tory relief or a writ of mandamus5 6
Not surprisingly, the California Supreme Court denied the church's
request for review. The church appealed to the United States Supreme
Court where certiorari was granted. In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, the Supreme Court reversed the California Court of Appeal and
remanded the case with instructions to the effect that temporary takings
must be compensable in order to satisfy the dictates of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution.57 In reaching the
temporary takings question, the Court specifically refused to address
whether the church had been denied all use of the campground by the
interim ordinance. If the majority had considered the merits of the case,
it would have been difficult to find that the flood protection ordinance
was an improper use of the police power or a taking.58 Instead, the Court
simply declared that the California Supreme Court's rule against the doc-
trine of inverse condemnation "truncated the rule" established in Penn-
sylvania Coal.5 9
While the Court tried to limit the holding of First Lutheran Church
to the facts presented-that is, a situation where an ordinance denied a
party all use of its property-it has clearly opened the door to increased
litigation in an area already fraught with disputes. In stating that it was
55. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255
(1980).
56. In Agins v. Tiburon, the California Supreme Court explicitly disapproved of the doctrine of
inverse condemnation as a matter of public policy. "[The need for preserving a degree of freedom in
the land-use planning function, and the inhibiting financial force which inheres in the inverse con-
demnation remedy, persuade us that on balance mandamus or declaratory relief rather than inverse
condemnation is the appropriate relief under the circumstances." Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d, at
276-277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378. Under this scenario, if a county decided that it
wanted to maintain the flood protection zone's development prohibition after the regulation had
been declared a taking, then at that point eminent domain would have to be exercised and compensa-
tion paid.
57. Strangely enough, Justice Brennan and some of the more conservative members of the Court
find themselves in agreement on this issue. Justice Brennan has been a staunch advocate of this
position. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See also Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The White River Junction
Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. 193 (1984) (opposing compensation for temporary takings).
58. See, e.g., Adolph v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 854 F.2d 732, 740 (1988);
Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F.Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978) (summary judgment),
aff'd mem., 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979).
59. First Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 316-17; Pumpelly, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 177-78.
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not dealing with the issues arising from "normal delays in obtaining
building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like",
the Court has left in question whether abnormal delays, however they
may be defined, would be subject to a temporary takings analysis. 60
First Lutheran Church may impair the ability of government offi-
cials to engage in careful deliberations over the long-term consequences
of competing land use plans.6' Since the Supreme Court decides takings
questions on a case-by-case basis, land use regulators must now ascertain
the unascertainable: whether their control of private property will result
in a future Supreme Court decision finding that a temporary taking has
occurred. This new liability may have a chilling effect upon informed
decision-making by agencies in charge of implementing coastal zone
management programs.
IV. TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: PRESERVING PUBLIC
ACCESS THROUGH COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, as development, industrialization,
and recreation along the nation's coasts intensified, coastal zone manage-
ment became an imperative. 62 Congress responded to the conflicting de-
mands being made upon coastal resources by enacting the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972 (CZMA).6 3 The CZMA declared "that it is the
national policy... to preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to
restore or enhance, the resources of the Nation's coastal zone for this and
succeeding generations." 6 It was the objective of the CZMA to achieve
60. First Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 321. Exec. Order No. 12,630, § 3(d), 53 Fed. Reg. 8859,
8861, discussed infra, has recognized this potential liability and has cautioned agencies and depart-
ments that:
While normal governmental processes do not ordinarily effect takings, undue delays in
decision-making [which interfere with private property use] carry a risk of being held to
be takings. Additionally, a delay in processing may increase significantly the size of com-
pensation due if a taking is later found to have occurred.
61. An example of this is a directive contained in Exec. Order No. 12,630, § 4(c), which states
as follows:
When a proposed action involves a permitting process or any other decision-making
process that will interfere with, or otherwise prohibit, the use of private property pend-
ing the completion of the process, the duration of the process shall be kept to the mini-
mum necessary. 53 Fed. Reg. at 8861.
62. See SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY O1'
THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED IN 1974 AND 1976, at 194-198
(1976)[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CZMA].
63. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464. Congress found that
"[t]here is a national interest in the effective management, beneficial use, protection, and develop-
ment of the coastal zone." 16 U.S.C. § 145 1(a).
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1452(l).
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these broad policy goals by providing financial and technical assistance
to the states, who would implement their own coastal management pro-
grams (CMPs).6" The provisions of the CZMA are currently adminis-
tered by the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management
(OCRM) in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). 66
The voters of California also enacted coastal zone management leg-
islation in 1972, by passing the Coastal Initiative of 1972 or Proposition
20.67 The Coastal Initiative established a state Coastal Zone Conserva-
tion Commission with six regional coastal commissions. 68 The commis-
sions prepared CMPs for submission to the state legislature and were
given temporary authority to issue development permits. 69 Proposition
20 and the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission were re-
placed by the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Coastal Act) and the Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission (Commission).70
Since its inception, the Commission has been fairly aggressive in its
implementation of the public access requirements of section 30212 of the
Coastal Act 71 and has encountered serious criticism from conservative
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1455. In 1976, the CZMA was ammended by adding section 305(b)(7), codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(7), in order to emphasize the already existing implicit requirement that state
CMPs protect public access to beaches. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CZMA, at 759. Section
305(b)(7) read as follows:
(b) The management program for each coastal state shall include each of the follow-
ing requirements: ...
(7) A definition of the term 'beach' and a planning process for the protection of, and
access to, public beaches and other public coastal areas of environmental, recreational,
historical, esthetic, ecological, or cultural value. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CZMA, at 583-84.
66. NOAA is a part of the United States Department of Commerce. For a discussion of current
issues involved in implementing the CZMA, see Coastal Zone Management and Resource Protection:
Hearing On The Problem of Coastal Pollution, Examine the Development and Land Use in The
Coastal Zone and Effective, Predictable Plans That Should Be Permitted Before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment and the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-57 (1988) (statement of
Thomas J. Maginnis, Assistant Administrator for Ocean Services and Coastal Zone Management,
NOAA, U.S. Dept. of Commerce).
67. Codified at CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 27000-27650 repealed by CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§§ 30000-30900 (West 1986).
68. CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 27001(d) quoted in M. MOGULOF, SAVING THE COAST: CALIFOR-
NIA'S EXPERIMENT IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL LAND USE CONTROL 116 (1975) [hereinafter SAV-
ING THE COAST].
69. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 27001(b) & 27300 quoted in SAVING THE COAST, at 116, 123.
70. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1986). Under CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§§ 30500-30504, the regional commissions were eliminated. They are being replaced by local coastal
programs (LCPs) certified by the California Coastal Commission.
71. See Tabor, The California Coastal Commission and Regulatory Takings, 17 PAC. L.J. 863,
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commentators.72 In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,7" the
United States Supreme Court attempted to answer the cries of the critics
by applying a takings analysis to some of the Commission's practices.
In Nollan, the Court placed new limitations on the power of land
use regulators to require developer exactions. These exactions are condi-
tions which developers must satisfy in order to gain approval for their
construction projects from planning authorities.74 Nollan set forth new,
stringent nexus requirements for conditions placed upon the granting of
permits, thereby restricting the use of exactions.75 If permit conditions do
not meet Nollan's nexus requirements, the Court will declare them a tak-
ing. Permit conditions have been used by coastal zone management pro-
grams to ensure that development in the coastal zone does not violate the
public interest. Therefore, the Nollan decision may adversely affect pro-
grams which protect public rights in the coastal zone.
A. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
The Nollans owned beachfront property situated between two pub-
lic beach areas in Ventura County, California. They originally leased the
property and a 504 square foot, single story bungalow which was located
on the parcel. 76 After years of being rented to other parties, the bunga-
low's condition had deteriorated, and the Nollans' purchase option to
their lease required the construction of a new bungalow on the prem-
868-870 (1986) (discussing the implementation of section 30212 of the Coastal Act by the Commis-
sion through its Statewide Interpretive Guidelines promulgated under CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 30620(a)(3)).
72. See, eg., Slimp, The Sovereign Commission: Of Coastal Permits, Continuing Jurisdiction, and
Vanishing Local Independence, 16 Sw. U.L. REV. 699, 721 (1986) ("In its efforts to maintain control
despite the independence guaranteed to local governments with certified LCPs, the Commission is
designing a post-certification manual that will envelope [sic] local governments in a 'partnership'
uncontemplated by the [Coastal] Act.").
73. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
74. Exactions are usually in the form of land dedicated by the developer for public use or pay-
ment of an impact fee.
75. The general impetus for exactions and impact fees is to ease the burden placed upon local
governments to develop infrastructure when a new subdivision is constructed. See Bauman & Eth-
ier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of American Practices, 50 LAW & CONTEMP,
PRoas. 51 (1987), for a discussion of why local governments are becoming increasingly reliant upon
these techniques. See also Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Commu-
nity Costs on New Suburban Residents through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964).
In coastal zone management, exactions are used to preserve the public's right of visual and physi-
cal access to the tidelands. Sometimes these exactions also serve the function of compensating the
public for lost access due to construction projects along the coast. See discussion of Nollan, infra.
76. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
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ises. 7 In order to build the proposed new structure, the Nollans had to
apply for a development permit from the California Coastal Commis-
sion. 78 The Commission granted the permit for the intensified develop-
ment of the lot, on the condition that the Nollans record a public access
easement across their beach between their eight-foot seawall 79 and the
historic mean high tide line.
The Nollans subsequently filed for a writ of administrative manda-
mus in the Ventura County Superior Court to have the access condition
invalidated.8" The trial court remanded the case for a full evidentiary
hearing, on the ground that the condition for the development permit
could not be required by the Coastal Commission unless there was evi-
dence that the proposed construction would "have a direct adverse im-
pact on public access to the beach.""1 After the hearing, the Commission
found that such direct adverse impact would occur in the form of re-
duced visual and psychological access to the foreshore82 of the beach to
which the public had access rights.
83
According to the Commission, the reductions in visual and psycho-
logical access would result from the cumulative effect of the Nollans'
development plan, when considered in conjunction with other neighbor-
ing development activities. The Commission concluded that the Nollans'
new home would decrease the public's ability to see the coastline by
"contributing to the development of 'a wall of residential structures' that
would prevent the public 'psychologically... from realizing a stretch of
77. 483 U.S. at 827, 828.
78. This was pursuant to CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30106, 30212, and 30600 (West 1986) cited
in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 483. U.S. 825, 828 (1987).
79. The seawall separated the beach from the rest of the property which would undergo devel-
opment. Id. at 827.
80. Id. at 828.
81. Id.
82. The public right of access to navigable waters has historically included the right of access to
areas between the high and low water marks of tidelands, commonly referred to as the foreshore.
For an excellent history of the development of the public's right to the foreshore in American juris-
prudence see Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, I SEA
GRANT L.J. 13, 41-79 (1976).
83. The Nollans' proposed development plan would replace the one-story bungalow of approxi-
mately 500 square feet with a two-story home covering approximately 2,400 feet. Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 856 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). While these figures were in
dispute, it suffices to say that the Nollans wanted to expand the development of their land by over
two times the previous square footage. The Nollans' brief claimed that "[t]he true lot coverage by the
new house and garage is 1,236 square feet, not 2,464 square feet." See Brief of Appellants at 9, n.9,
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 483 U.S. 825 (No. 86-133) (1987).
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coastline exists nearby that they have every right to visit.' "I'
The Nollans sought another writ of administrative mandamus from
the Superior Court to contest the factual findings of the Commission in
the evidentiary hearing. This writ was granted, and the permit condition
eliminated, on the ground that there was insufficient factual basis in the
record to determine that the Nollans' new development plan would bur-
den public access to the coastline." The Commission appealed to the
California Court of Appeal which reversed the Superior Court. 6 In its
decision, the California Court of Appeal interpreted section 30212 (a)
and (b)(2) of the Coastal Act to require a building permit to be condi-
tioned upon a provision of public access.8 7 The Court of Appeal also
dismissed the Nollans' taking claim, because the building permit condi-
tion merely diminished the value of the Nollans' property and did not
constitute a deprivation of all "reasonable use."88 The California
Supreme Court denied review, and the Nollans appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court found that the building permit condition vio-
lated the takings clause, incorporated against the States by the fourteenth
84. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828, 829 (quoting the California Coastal Commission's factual findings
from the evidentiary hearing conducted on remand from the Ventura County Superior Court).
The public's right of access is conferred by CAL. CONST., art. X, § 4 (West 1989) which provides:
No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or possessing the frontage or tidal
lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water in this State, shall be
permitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required for aly public
purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of such water; and the Legislature
shall enact such laws as will give the most liberal construction to this provision, so that
access to the navigable waters of this State shall be always attainable for the people
thereof. (emphasis added).
85. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829.
86. While the case was on appeal, the Nollans went ahead with their development plan without
providing notice to the Commission. Id. at 829, 830.
87. 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (2d Dist. 1986). Section 30212 of the Code pro-
vides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Public access from the nearest public roadway to the shoreline and along the coast
shall be provided in new development projects except where... (2)adequate access exists
nearby ....
(b) For purposes of this section, 'new development' does not include: ... (2)The demoli-
tion and reconstruction of a single-family residence; provided, that the reconstructed
residence shall not exceed either the floor area, height or bulk, of the former structure by
more than 10 percent ... CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30212.
It appears that the California Court of Appeal misinterpreted the plain meaning of the statute in
this instance, since public access to the shoreline is to be provided "from the nearest public road-
way," not laterally across a beach.
88. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 723.
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amendment, and reversed the California Court of Appeal.8 9 In a 5-4
opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court reasoned that the condition as ap-
plied to the Nollans was a taking for two reasons. First, the Court de-
clared that a public access easement across the Nollans' beach would
result in a "permanent physical occupation" of the property, and that
this was a taking under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV
Corp. 90 Second, the Court found that the condition did not "substantially
advance legitimate state interests," as required by Agins v. Tiburon.9"
While the Court was willing to assume, for the sake of argument,
that preserving the public's view of the beach and surmounting the psy-
chological barrier to using the beach were legitimate state interests, it
nevertheless imposed severe nexus requirements on the development per-
mit condition. The Court viewed the permit condition as unconstitu-
tional because there was a lack of sufficient nexus between the lateral
access easement and the legitimate state interest in preservation of the
coastal view and psychological access.
The Court reasoned that, hypothetically, the Commission could
place height or width restrictions on the proposed construction or re-
quire that "the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for pass-
ersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would
89. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 842 (1987).
90. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). The Court stated:
We think a 'permanent physical occupation' has occurred, for purposes of [the rule in
Loretto,] where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and
fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular
individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises.
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832.
The Court in Loretto, however, took a contrary position with respect to the passage of persons to
and fro across a property. It quoted St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 U.S. 92, 98-99,
101-102 (1893), which established that the passage of foot and vehicle traffic across city streets did
not constitute a permanent physical occupation of the city's property, whereas the installation of
telegraph poles on the streets did.
The use which the [company] makes of the streets is an exclusive and permanent one,
and not one temporary, shifting and in common with the general public. The ordinary
traveler, whether on foot or in a vehicle, passes to and fro along the streets, and his use and
occupation thereof are temporary and shifting. The space he occupies one moment he
abandons the next to be occupied by any other traveler...
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 428-29 (quoting St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 U.S. at 98)(em-
phasis added).
It appears that the Court tried to pigeon-hole Nollan into the category of a permanent physical
occupation, but decided to confront the balancing test anyway. This was probably due to some
insecurity about whether a right-of-way easement across the Nollans' beach, which did not permit
any member of the public to station themselves upon the premises, could reasonably be classified as a
permanent physical occupation.
91. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
interfere." 92 These were seen as permissible exercises of the police power
because the means employed were directly related to the advancement of
a legitimate state interest; whereas, the Court perceived the condition
placed upon the Nollans as having nothing to do with the legitimate in-
terest put forth to justify it.
The Court acknowledged, however, that its hypothetical coastal
viewing spot condition would create "a permanent grant of continuous
access to the property. '9 3 This grant would be as much a permanent
physical occupation as the Commission's condition, which the Court
claimed violated Loretto.94 The contradiction in the Court's analysis
demonstrates that the Court has yet to develop a precise definition as to
what will constitute a physical occupation of property." The term
"physical occupation" does little to clarify what in fact is a per se tak-
ing,96 and the Court's use of this term in the Nollan case showed that a
physical occupation can mean almost anything. 97
92. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.
93. Id.
94. Cf, United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) and Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S.
84 (1962) (both of which held that the noise and vibrations from frequent overflights of aircraft
constituted a taking, because they completely destroyed the use of the properties for farming and
residential purposes).
95. The growth of the Court's physical occupation classification may encourage local govern-
ments to increase their use of impact fees. For example, instead of requiring a public dedication of
land by a developer which might constitute a physical occupation, a local government could exact
impact fees for the construction of parks and purchase the land for the parks from the developer
through eminent domain. The result would be the same in both instances, except that in the latter,
the Agins balancing test would be the most important consideration. Cf Builders Ass'n. v. Guilder-
land, 141 AD2d 293, 534 N.Y.S.2d 791 (3d Dept. 1988) (Invalidating a transportation impact fee
law because the law was not reasonably related to the promotion of public safety, but rather a device
to raise revenue).
96. See Penn Central, and Loretto as examples of the doctrine in use. While the Court did not
find that a physical occupation or a taking had occurred in Penn Central, there is theoretical debate
over whether the Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) given to Penn Central, prevented a
takings problem from actually occurring or were compensation for a taking that had occurred. See
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978); Marcus, The Grand Slam
Grand Central Terminal Decision: A Euclid for Landmarks, Favorable Notice for TDR and a Resolu-
tion of the Regulatory Taking Impasse, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 731, 747 (1979); Malone, The Future of
Transferable Development Rights in the Supreme Court, 73 KENTUCKY L.J. 759, 783-784 (1985).
The Court could easily have found that a physical occupation had occurred in Penn Central if it
decided that the regulation had gone too far, since it could be argued that denying the owner the use
of the airspace above its property constituted a physical occupation. The central point of the argu-
ment would, of course, have to be that at least some portion of the airspace had been occupied. But
this would not be such an unreasonable assumption since this was the practical effect of the regula-
tion. See, eg., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S.
84 (1962).
97. See, e.g., Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from dismissal of appeal for want of substantial federal question) arguing that the applica-
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B. Public Rights are Fungible Public Commodities
The Nollans could have built a new home without a permit from the
Coastal Commission if the new structure did not exceed the size of the
previous home by more than ten percent. Therefore, the Nollans could
have rejected the Commission's public access easement by building a
home approximately the same size as their old bungalow.
According to the Supreme Court, the Coastal Commission could
have imposed height and width restrictions upon the Nollans' proposed
construction of a larger house or even required an access site on their
property, if preserving the public's view of the coast was a legitimate
state objective. In such a scenario, the Commission's power to impose
building permit conditions would have had a profound economic impact
upon the value of the Nollans' property. Therefore, the Commission's
ability to impose development restrictions or requirements would have
been a public commodity worth a great deal to the Nollans.
Since the value of the hypothetical restrictions could have been
worth more than the public access easement, the Nollans might have
decided that they would benefit by making a trade if they wanted a larger
house. Of course, due to intangibles which cannot be measured in eco-
nomic terms, it would have been equally plausible for the Nollans to pre-
fer to exclude people from their beach by accepting other limitations. In
that instance, they could have accepted regulations such as height and
width restrictions or decided to build a similar sized house, but the
choice would have been theirs to make, not the Supreme Court's.98
The Court was concerned that conditioned building permits have
sometimes been used by planning authorities in an unjustifiably coercive
manner. Yet, the Court failed to assess whether or not the Commission
would substantially advance a legitimate state objective by denying a per-
mit outright due to reductions in visual access. Therefore, the Court
missed a crucial step in its analysis, because a fair exchange of rights can
only exist if both parties actually have rights to exchange.
The Court should not have applied a rational nexus test to the sub-
stantial advancement of a legitimate state objective and to an exchange of
public and private rights. Unreasonable building permit conditions can
tion of a rent control statute which prevented the removal of property from Cambridge, Massachu-
setts' rental housing market amounted to a "permanent physical invasion" of private property.
98. Of course, a determination that the public has a right to view the coast, and that this right
should be protected via zoning restrictions instead of by alternative means, would necessarily be a
political decision. See Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's The Problem of Social Cost: A
View From the Left, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 919, 923-925 (1986).
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be safeguarded against by determining whether public fights actually ex-
ist in each particular situation. In cases such as Nollan, construction per-
mit denials by the Commission must substantially advance the goal of
protecting visual access, and that goal must be a legitimate state interest
or public fight, for a later exchange of fights to be possible. If these con-
ditions are not satisfied, then a rational exchange of fights cannot take
place, since the Commission cannot exchange what it does not possess. 99
C. Cumulative effects
Assessments of whether a public fight has been infringed can be in-
accurate if the cumulative effects of development have not been consid-
ered. For example, if the impact of the Nollans' development was not
considered in conjunction with the impact of their neighbors' develop-
ment, then denying the Nollans a permit might not appear to substan-
tially advance protection of visual access to the coast." ° Nevertheless,
individual actions, which by themselves might not impose upon public
fights, can significantly harm public fights through their cumulative
effects. 10'
It is important to recognize that the Nollans' parcel was in an area
whose scenic beauty could easily have been destroyed by intensive devel-
opment, and that scenic views are valuable to the public. By virtue of the
parcel's location in the coastal zone, the externalities t°2 arising from the
Nollans' construction proposal were greater than those of "ordinary"
land-owners seeking development permits and, as such, should have been
99. The assumption that the public has a right of visual access to the beach is not undisputed.
However, there appears to be significant and widespread recognition that the public does have rights
in preservation of natural resources (such as scenic areas) or open spaces. The Euclid case and New
York State's Adirondack Park are examples which support the assumption that the public has a
right in preserving scenic areas and open spaces. See Horizon Adirondack Corp. v. State of New
York, 88 Misc.2d 619, 388 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Ct.CI. 1976); People v. Goodman, 31 N.Y.2d 262, 266,
338 N.Y.S.2d 97, 290 N.E.2d 139 (1972); Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 298, 150 N.E. 120, 43
A.L.R. 651 (1925); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972). Cf State
v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716, 46 A.L.R.3d 1414 (Me. 1970).
100. Tabor, The California Coastal Commission and Regulatory Takings, 17 PAC. L.J. 863, 872
(1986) (discussing Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n., 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 167, 212 Cal. Rptr.
578, 589-590 (1985).
101. Professor Sax has referred to these as "spillover effects." See Sax, Takings, Private Property
and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 161 (1971).
102. For the purposes of this article, an externality is land use which deprives someone, without
their consent, of an amenity to which they are entitled. This is based upon the definition of externali-
ties adopted in a book by James E. Meade, see MEADE, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC EXTERNALI-
TIES: THE CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND SIMILAR SOCIAL COSTS 15 (1979). Of
course, whether someone has been deprived of an amenity is necessarily a subjective determination,
since what is an amenity to one person may be an "eyesore" to another.
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treated differently.1"3
California's ten percent limit on unapproved development was an
effort to protect a vulnerable coastal zone from the cumulative effects of
development."14 After Nollan, this governmental interest continues to be
valid. Furthermore, the Court did not nullify the requirement that the
Commission approve new development exceeding ten percent of an origi-
nal structure.
It would be logical for the Court to acknowledge that, as with the
large-scale development of a single tract, substantial environmental deg-
radation can arise from the cumulative impact of many small individual
development projects. Land use restrictions employed to prevent cumula-
tive impacts adverse to public rights should be considered valid in their
application to groups of individuals as a whole, in the same manner as
they would apply to subdivision developers. To draw a distinction be-
tween the two, emphasizes form rather than substance.105
D. A Lesson From Aquaculture Leasing
Proposed salmon aquaculture projects in Maine have demonstrated
that aesthetic values should be considered more seriously in the Court's
future takings jurisprudence. In Maine, private property owners along
the coast have been oppospd to salmon aquaculture out of fear that the
projects will reduce the scenic splendor of the coast and their property
values. 10 6 Even though Maine's Site Location of Development Act0 7
may require that visual impact be considered for large aquaculture
projects, 10 8 private property owners have remained concerned about the
possible detrimental effects of state aquaculture leasing proposals. Thus,
in Maine, aquaculture leasing has raised a problem exactly opposite to
103. This is why the Coastal Act was passed in the first place. See Rieser, Managing the Cumu-
lative Effects of Coastal Land Development: Can Maine Law Meet the Challenge?, 39 ME. L. REV.
321, 372-385 (1987) for a discussion of the California Environmental Quality Act and the California
Coastal Act.
104. 15 C.F.R. § 923.1 1(c)(2) (1987) instructs states to consider the cumulative impacts of resi-
dential and commercial development in identifying "those land and water uses that will be subject to
the terms of the management program." 15 C.F.R. § 923.11(b)(1) (1987).
105. Professor Sax, quite correctly, criticized boundary theories of property rights for precisely
this reason. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 154-55 (1971).
106. Burrowes, How Are You Going to Get Them Down to the Farm? Legal Obstacles to Salmon
Farming in Maine, 8 TERRITORIAL SEA- LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF
OCEAN AND COASTAL RESOURCES 1, 9 (1988)[hereinafter TERRITORIAL SEA].
107. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.38, § 484(3) cited in TERRITORIAL SEA, at 9 n.61.
108. TERRITORIAL SEA, at 9 n.61. In Washington State, under the state's CMP, San Juan
County has drafted provisions in its "Master Plan" which recognize and regulate the potential visual
impacts of salmon acquaculture. Id. at 10, n.66-73 with accompanying text.
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the one presented in the Nollan case; there is the spectre of public land
use infringing on the visual rights of private property owners. The Maine
acquaculture leasing experience demonstrates that scenic rights are valu-
able both to the public and to private property owners, alike. Therefore,
the Supreme Court's failure to affirm public scenic rights in its vindica-
tion of private property rights in Nollan may become a double-edged ide-
ological sword.
E. Public Rights and a "Rational" Nexus
Even though the Nollan Court implicitly acknowledged the public's
right to view the foreshore in its analysis, the practical effect of the deci-
sion was to deny the existence of public rights.' 09 Perhaps Justice Scalia
was disturbed that the public would have received more than just an-
other view under the Commission's condition. Of course, the Nollans'
would also have gained according to the Court's reasoning, since it was
hypothetically assumed by the Court that the Commission could have
denied the permit altogether under the police power."10 In other words, a
more optimal equilibrium of coastal rights could have been achieved.
When a developer's actions impose costs or externalities upon local
governments or the public at large, a rational-nexus requirement should
concern itself with making certain that a developer pays only for the
problems caused by the development. Therefore, the issue, which is two-
fold, is actually one of making certain that public rights are genuinely
being infringed, and that the correct price is paid by the developer as
compensation. "'
The essential problem with categorizing the Commission's action
109. The Court implicitly recognized the public's right to view the foreshore in the following
hypothetical:
The Commission argues that a permit condition that serves the same legitimate police-
power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should not be found to be a taking if the
refusal to issue the permit would not constitute a taking. We agree. Thus, if the Commis-
sion attached to the permit some condition that would have protected the public's ability
to see the beach notwithstanding construction of the new house -for example, a height
limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on fences-so long as the Commission could
have exercised its police power (as we have assumed it could) to forbid construction of
the house altogether, imposition of the condition would also be constitutional.
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987) (emphasis added).
The Court's assumption that the Commission could have prohibited the construction of the pro-
posed house was logical, since such a prohibition would not have denied the Nollans economically
viable use of their property; the Nollans could have constructed a house that was up to ten percent
larger than their previous one without Commission approval.
110. Id.
11I. Query, how would the Court analyze the denial of a permit followed one or perhaps five
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concerning the Nollans as a taking was that the state did not appropriate
the easement, nor did the state force the Nollans to give the easement to
the state. The logic of the Court's holding that there was a taking was,
therefore, premised upon an assumption that the Commission did not
have the right to deny the Nollans a permit.112 Under its rational-nexus
test, the Court must have presumed that denying the Nollans a permit to
construct a two-story structure would not (rationally) substantially ad-
vance a legitimate state interest. In fact, the legitimate state interest, pro-
tecting visual access, would be substantially and directly advanced by
denying the Nollans a permit to expand their structure beyond ten per-
cent of its previous size.1 13  The Court's reasoning in Nollan forecloses
the possibility that a logical and reasonable exchange of public and pri-
vate property rights may take place, unless there is a rational-nexus be-
tween the exchange and the substantial advancement of the legitimate
state interest. As a consequence, economically inferior transactions are
likely to occur to the detriment of private and public interests.
Permit denials should be required to substantially advance a partic-
ular legitimate state interest, such as preserving visual access; however, a
rational-nexus requirement should not apply to an actual exchange of
public and private rights. While the Court claimed that the state sought
to take an easement for public benefit, a more plausible analysis indicates
that the state sought to receive the easement as compensation for exter-
nalities associated with a private benefit. The Court should acknowledge
that public rights are as transferable as development rights (TDRs).
If Transferable Public Rights (TPRs) were recognized as legitimate
by the Court, a state could allow externalities to be imposed upon the
public, provided adequate compensation was paid.114 In future situations
years later by a negotiated exchange of rights? Should the Court's finding of "extortion" really be
dependent upon the juxtaposition in time?
112. This was true even though the Court assumed, for the sake of argument, that the Commis-
sion had the right to deny the permit.
113. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30212 (West 1986) supra note 87. See also Comment, Public
Beach Access Exactions: Extending the Public Trust Doctrine to Vindicate Public Rights, 28 UCLA L.
REV. 1049, 1086 (1981) (by Jonathan M. Hoff) (arguing that traditional exaction analyses should not
apply to beach access exactions, because "[t]he underlying objective sought to be achieved is the
vindication of a latent public right of access to, and use of, the tidelands across the uplands.").
114. The logic of Transferable Public Rights is supported by Justice Scalia's observation in
Nollan:
The Commission's assumed power to forbid construction of the house in order to pro-
tect the public's view of the beach must surely include the power to condition construc-
tion upon some concession by the owner, even a concession of property rights, that
serves the same end. If a prohibition designed to accomplish that purpose would be a
legitimate exercise of the police power rather than a taking, it would be strange to con-
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similar to the Nollans' case, if courts refuse to consider TPRs, land use
regulators will have no choice but to veto proposed development, in or-
der to protect the public's property rights in the coast's scenic beauty. 1 5
This trend could result in increased takings litigation. TPRs would en-
able coastal zone management authorities to resolve the conflicting goals
of the CZMA; namely, TPRs would enable them to encourage develop-
ment and conservation of coastal resources at the same time.
F. Transferable Public Rights
Transferable Public Rights (TPRs) can protect public rights, pro-
mote optimal use of natural resources, and place practical limits on the
police power. If a permit condition is imposed when an externality does
not exist (that is to say, the externality is a bureaucratic fabrication) or
the required compensation to the public exceeds the harm caused by the
private benefit, then a taking has occurred. Of course, this approach may
ultimately require the Court to define public and private property rights
more specifically and make value judgments about competing rights and
uses." 6 Although imperfect, it would at least provide an intellectually
honest approach to the taking issue.
The Court's rational-nexus test may guard somewhat against
fabricated harms to the public, and as a consequence, strengthen the
"substantially advance a legitimate government interest" prong of the
Agins-Penn Central test. It does not, however, protect landowners from
being required to pay compensation to the public which exceeds the
elude that providing the owner an alternative to that prohibition which accomplishes the
same purpose is not.
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987).
115. See SAVING THE COAST, supra note 68, at 13 (coastal commissions engage in negotiations
over zoning restrictions and development conditions in order to escape the "dilemma of approving
nothing or everything ... ").
Aside from any natural rights that the public may have in the coastal zone, public rights are
acknowledged by statute in the COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1972, and the CALIFORNIA
COASTAL ACT OF 1976.
116. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928), where the Court held that it was a
permissible exercise of the police power for the state to order the destruction of privately-owned
cedar trees, to prevent the transmission of cedar rust to neighboring apple orchards. The Court
declared "[w]hen forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by
deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to save another which, in the judg-
ment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public." Id. at 279. Cf Department of Agric. &
Consumer Serv. v. Mid Florida Growers, Inc., 521 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1988) (taking occurred when
state destroyed healthy trees), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 180 (1989). As in Miller v. Schoene, since an
infinite number of optimal equilbriums of property rights are possible with exchanges utilizing
TPRs, deciding which equilibrium to adopt necessarily requires the use of normative values.
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harm caused by the private benefit. As in the Nollans' case, it would be
difficult to argue that they were denied "economically viable" use of their
land by the Commission's condition. Yet, the Commission's condition
might, in such a circumstance, be excessive compensation to the public.
The Court's analysis overcompensates for a weak economic prong
of the test by making planning authorities pass through the eye of a nee-
dle in order to substantially advance a legitimate government interest.
The application of a takings test, which does not contemplate an ex-
change of rights, is bound to yield inferior results in a situation where
such an exchange is the central focus of the controversy.
An approach which utilizes TPRs strengthens both prongs of the
Penn Central-Agins analysis without overcompensating on either side.
First, the government must demonstrate that an externality has or will be
caused by the private benefit. Second, TPRs afford landowners greater
protection than the "economically viable use" prong of the test by requir-
ing that the compensation to the public be commensurate with the harm
caused by the private benefit. Individuals such as the Nollans, who need
not fear reprisals by planning authorities on future development projects,
can enforce the second part of the test themselves by turning down an
exchange. Developers, who might be coerced by the potential for adverse
action by planning authorities on future projects, can rely on the courts
to determine if an exchange was "rational." '117 Courts have proven ex-
tremely effective in assessing harm in economic terms.
V. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,630
During his last spring in the White House, President Reagan issued
Executive Order 12,630 "1 in order to acquaint federal departments and
agencies with the Supreme Court's new positions on takings and govern-
mental regulation. 19 Under the Executive Order, executive departments
117. For examples of coercive techniques which have been used by planning authorities against
developers, see Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest For a Ration-
ale, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 871, 880-881 (1967).
118. 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1988).
119. Several policy directives of the Order specifically articulate the Supreme Court's recent
positions on takings. For example, Section 3(b) advises that "[A]ctions undertaken by governmental
officials that result in a physical invasion or occupancy of private property, and regulations imposed
on private property that substantially affect its value or use, may constitute a taking of property." 53
Fed. Reg. at 8860-8861.
Section 3(d) of the Order addresses the temporary takings issue in First Lutheran Church as
follows:
While normal governmental processes do not ordinarily effect takings, undue delays in
decision-making [which interfere with private property use] carry a risk of being held to
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and agencies must utilize "Guidelines for the Evaluation of Risk and
Avoidance of Unanticipated Takings," which are published by the Attor-
ney General, when "proposing, planning, and implementing" policies
with "takings implications."' 20 The Order specifies that regulations
which require licensing, permitting, dedications, exactions, or other limi-
tations on private property, Are policies with "takings implications.", 2
In order to comply with Executive Order 12,630, federal depart-
ments and agencies must designate a takings officer who will ensure com-
pliance.122 Departments and agencies must also "identify the takings
implications of proposed regulatory actions and address the merits of
those actions in light of the identified takings implications, if any, in all
required submissions made to the Office of Management and Budget. '23
Under Executive Order 12,291,124 the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) has reviewed the merits of regulation using cost-benefit analyses
that federal agencies and departments have submited to OMB for regula-
tory approval.' 25 Significant regulatory battles may occur between fed-
be takings. Additionally, a delay in processing may increase significantly the size of com-
pensation due if a taking is later found to have occurred.
53 Fed. Reg. at 8861.
Section 4(c) attempts to minimize temporary takings liability for Executive departments and
agencies by requiring that:
When a proposed action involves a permitting process or any other decision-making
process that will interfere with, or otherwise prohibit, the use of private property pend-
ing the completion of the process, the duration of the process shall be kept to the mini-
mum necessary. Id.
Of course, Federal departments and agencies may wonder: the "minimum necessary" for what?
Section 4(a)(1)&(2) addresses the nexus issue raised in Nollan, by stating that:
Executive departments and agencies shall adhere, to the extent permitted by law, to the
following criteria when implementing policies that have takings implications:
(a) When an Executive department or agency requires a private party to obtain a permit
in order to undertake a specific use of, or action with respect to, private property, any
conditions imposed on the granting of a permit shall:
(1) Serve the same purpose that would have been served by a prohibition of the use or
action; and
(2) Substantially advance that purpose.
120. § I (c), Id. at 8859.
121. § 2, Id. at 8859-60.
122. § 5(a), Id. at 8862.
123. § 5(b), 53 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8862 (1988).
124. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
125. See Sagoff, At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima or Why Political Questions Are Not All
Economic, 23 ARIZ. L. REv. 1283, 1288-89, n.22 (1981) which argues in part that "[to] the extent
that economic factors are permissible considerations under enabling statutes, agencies should engage
in cost-effectiveness analysis, which aids in determining the least costly means to designated goals,
rather than cost-benefit analysis, which improperly determines regulatory ends as well as means,"
(citation omitted).
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eral regulators and the OMB if the requirements of Executive Order
12,630 are strictly enforced with a controversial measure like Executive
Order 12,291, mandating the use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate
regulations.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S IMAGE IN THE FUN-HOUSE MIRROR
The cases which have been decided in the wake of the Supreme
Court's recent takings decisions have left regulators unable to anticipate
whether or not their actions will constitute takings of private property.
Presently, great uncertainty exists in takings jurisprudence, and the re-
sults of several recent lower court cases must have surprised the Supreme
Court.
A. The Ninth Circuit
In Lai v. City and County of Honolulu,126 public visual rights once
again clashed with a proposed development project. The Lais owned a
leasehold interest in a 30,000 square foot lot located near the scenic
Punchbowl Crater in Honolulu.127 In 1974, they planned to build a con-
dominium apartment building within the then existing 350-foot height
limitation for which the City of Honolulu's zoning ordinance pro-
vided. 28 However, in 1975, the City enacted a new zoning ordinance
which restricted construction higher than 25 feet above ground level.' 29
"The City's expressed purpose in enacting the ordinance was to establish
a scenic easement to protect one view of the Punchbowl Crater from the
H-1 Freeway." 130 The Lais filed suit in federal district court after the
City Council denied the Lais' developer's application for a "Certificate of
Appropriateness". 131 The Ninth Circuit eventually held that the taking
claim was not ripe for review because the plaintiffs had not sought a
variance.
However, before the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case, it engaged in
a takings analysis. In dicta, the court declared that the trial revealed that
"a scenic easement had diminished the value of the plaintiffs' prop-
126. 841 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 560 (1988).
127. Lai, 841 F.2d at 302.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Lai, 841 F.2d at 302. The district court dismissed the action and the Ninth Ciruit reversed
and remanded the case. After the district court entered a judgment for the developer, another appeal
was made to the Ninth Circuit. 841 F.2d at 301.
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erty." '1 32 Yet, the court observed that the Supreme Court in "its decisions
sustaining land-use regulations that 'are reasonably related to the promo-
tion of the general welfare, uniformly reject[s] the proposition that dimi-
nution in property value, standing alone, can establish a taking'." 13 The
court then concluded its takings analysis with a remarkable reading of
Nollan, which declared that "the Supreme Court expressly stated that a
height limitation preserving the public's scenic view is not a 'taking'."
So much for the "Supreme" Court.
Another Ninth Circuit case also reveals the reluctance of some
lower courts to apply Nollan's standards. In Citizen's Association of Port-
land v. International Raceways,'35 the plaintiffs alleged, among other the-
ories, that the noise from a city-owned racetrack was so great that it
constituted a taking of their property under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 136 Apparently, the association was unsuccessful in convinc-
ing the city to enforce a noise ordinance which would have prohibited
racing in the area. 137 After the association filed suit in federal district
court, the city granted the raceway a variance to the noise ordinance. 3 8
The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim.'39
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and held that
the members of the association failed to exhaust available state reme-
dies." 0 The court also declared that the members were not deprived of
"economically viable use" of their property, and that any "diminution"
in value which might have occurred was "rationally related to the gov-
ernmental interest in the raceway."'' In a flashback to Munn v. Illinois,
the court observed "[w]here, as here, the ordinance promotes a legitimate
132. Lai, 841 F.2d at 301, 302.
133. Id. (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978)).
134. Lai, 841 F.2d at 303 (construing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,, 483 U.S. 825
(1987)).
135. 833 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1987).
136. Citizens Ass'n. of Portland v. International Raceways Inc., 833 F.2d 760, 761 (1987).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. International Raceways, 833 F.2d at 762 (1987) (quoting Williamson County Regional
Planning v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 n.13 (1985)).
141. International Raceways, 833 F2d at 762. The court mentioned, but avoided applying, the
substantial advancement of a legitimate state interest test of Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980). The Ninth Circuit in Herrington v. Sonoma County, 834 F.2d 1488, 1498 n.7 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1557 (1989), acknowledged that Nollan indicated that the Agins test was
stricter than the "rationality" test commonly used in substantive due process cases, such as Minne-
sota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co, 449 U.S. 456 (1980) and Ross v. City of Berkeley, 655 F.Supp 820,
842 (N.D.Cal. 1987). Cf Tilles Inv. v. Town of Huntington 137 A.D.2d 118, 123, 528 N.Y.S.2d 386
(2nd Dept. 1988).
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governmental interest and is rationally related to that interest, any bur-
den some property owners must bear is better left to be resolved by the
democratic process."142
B. The California Coastal Commission: Walking Tall
The Supreme Court's decision in Nollan has not prevented the Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission from placing conditions on building permits.
In Jonathan Club v. California Coastal Commission,'43 the Commission
imposed a permit condition which required that the Jonathan Club issue
a non-discrimination statement before its proposed project would be ap-
proved. 1" Since the project was partially on a state-owned beach, the
California Court of Appeal upheld the condition on the grounds that it
was required by state and federal constitutional provisions on equal pro-
tection. The court reasoned that since the Jonathan Club was required to
pay $40,000 per year under its lease with the state, there was sufficient
state action to invoke state and federal equal protection guarantees.1
4
Furthermore, the court concluded that the Commission had the au-
thority to impose the condition under the California Coastal Act and the
California Constitution's beach access provisions. 146 In its analysis of the
Commission's permit condition, the court argued that the language in
Nollan supported the condition.147 The court distinguished Nollan to a
certain extent by claiming that unlike the case it was deciding, the major-
ity in Nollan had found "no rational connection between the expressed
governmental purpose" and the "imposed condition."'' 48  The court de-
clared the following:
Here, in contrast, there is a direct connection between the governmental
purpose of maximizing public access to state beach lands and the condition
142. 833 F.2d at 762 (citation omitted).
143. 197 Cal. App. 3d 884, 243 Cal. Rptr. 168 (Cal.App. 2 dist. 1988), appeal dismissed, 109
S.Ct. 209 (1988).
144. The condition read as follows: "Prior to transmittal of a permit, the Jonathan Club shall
deliver to the Executive Director a statement that the Club will not discriminate on the basis of race,
sex or religion. The certification of membership policy shall remain in effect during the life of this
project." 197 Cal. App.3d at 885; 243 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
145. Id. at 175.
146. See CAL. CONST., art. X, § 4, CAL. PUB.REs. CODE §§ 30001.5(c) & 30210, and § 54091 of
the CAL. GOV'T. CODE, cited at 243 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
147. The court quoted a passage from Nollan which stated that the Commission's "assumed
power to forbid construction of the house in order to protect the public's view of the beach must
surely include the power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner, even a
concession of property rights, that serves the same end." 243 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78 (quoting Nollan,
483 U.S. at 836). The Supreme Court's statement also supports the logic of TPRs.
148. 197 Cal. App.3d 887; 243 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
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which was imposed. Again, by precluding discrimination against minorities
in the Club's membership policies, the Commission maximized the possibil-
ity that all segments of the public will have access to the leased land. 149
The California Court of Appeal arrived at a strained but laudable
decision. It indicates that, at times, some California courts are willing to
give the Nollan "nexus" requirements for permit conditions the most
"liberal" interpretation possible, in all senses of the word.
VII. CONCLUSION
Executive Order 12,630 and several lower court decisions indicate
that the Supreme Court has introduced great uncertainty into planning
law and coastal zone management. As a result of the First Lutheran
Church decision, planners and coastal zone managers will now have to
worry about temporary takings liability for their regulations, with little
guidance from the Supreme Court and lower courts as to what will con-
stitute such a taking.15 0
Coastal zone management does not require a moritorium on coastal
zone development; however, coastline conservation is also a significant
imperative in Coastal Management Programs. Transferable Public
Rights would allow development while protecting the public's rights in
coastal areas. In Nollan, the Coastal Commission sought to trade the
public's right to view the tidelands for the Nollans' exclusionary right to
the beach. The Court's opinion should have focused on whether the pub-
lic had a right to view the coast. It makes sense to accord the public this
right. Since the public has the right to use the tidelands"5 ', it certainly
must have the right to see them. The beauty of the coastline should be
seen, not only heard.
MICHAEL NEIDERBACH
149. Id.
150. To make matters worse, "local governments and state agencies must accept controversial
decision-making roles in a decentralized [coastal zone management] system that does not sufficiently
guide their decisions." D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY: A REGULATORY CHAL-
LENGE 148 (1981).
151. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4; Talbot v. Town of Little Compton, 52 R.I. 280, 160 A.
466 (1932); Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Thornton v.
Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969); Tucci v. Salzhauer, 40 A.D.2d 712, 336 N.Y.S.2d 721
(1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 854 (1974); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61
N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47, 57 A.L.R.3d 983 (1972); Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal.3d 29, 84 Cal.
Rptr. 162, 465 P.2d 50 (1970).
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